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÷ Security demands
÷ Security functions of GSM
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÷ Security functions of UMTS
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Security deficits of existing mobile networks
• Example of security demands: Cooke, Brewster (1992)
– protection of user data
– protection of signaling information, incl. location
– user authentication, equipment verification
– fraud prevention (correct billing)
• Security deficits of GSM (selection)
– Only symmetric cryptography (algorithms no officially published)
– Weak protection of locations (against outsiders)
– No protection against insider attacks (location, message content)
– No end-to-end services (authentication, encryption)
• Summary
– GSM provides protection against external attacks only.
– “…the designers of GSM did not aim at a level of security much higer
than that of the fixed trunk network.” Mouly, Pautet (1992)
Security functions of GSM
• Overview
– Subscriber Identity Module (SIM, smart card)
• Admission control and crypto algorithms
– Authentication (Mobile station Æ network)
• Challenge-Response-Authentication (A3)
– Pseudonymization of users on the air interface
• Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI)
– Link encryption on the air interface
• Generation of session key: A8
• Encryption: A5
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Challenge-Response-Authentication
• When initialized by the mobile network?
– Location Registration
– Location Update when changing the VLR
– Call Setup (both directions)
– Short Message Service
• Protocol
Challenge-Response-Authentication
• Algorithm A3
– Implemented on SIM card and in Authentication Center (AuC)
– Cryptographic one way function A3:
SRES’ = A3(Ki, RAND) (Ki: individual user key)
– Interfaces are standardized, cryptographic algorithm not standardized
• Specific algorithm can be selected by the network operator
– Authentication data (RAND, SRES) are
requested from AuC by the visited MSC
– visited MSC: only compares SRES == SRES’
– visited MSC has to trust
home network operator
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Attacks – Telephone at the expense of others
• SIM cloning
–Weakness of authentication algorithm
• Interception of authentication data
–Eavesdropping of internal communication links
• IMSI catcher
–Man-in-the-middle attack on the air interface
SIM cloning
• Scope
– Telephone at the expense of others
– Described by Marc Briceno (Smart Card Developers Association), Ian
Goldberg and Dave Wagner (both University of California in Berkeley)
– http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/gsm.html
– Attack uses a weakness of algorithm COMP128, which implements
A3/A8
– SIM card (incl. PIN) must be under control of the attacker for at least 8-
12 hours
• Effort
– Approx. 150.000 calculations to determine Ki (max. 128 bit)
– 6,25 calculations per second only, due to slow serial interface of SIM
card
Interception of authentication data
• Scope
– Telephone at the expense of others
– Described by Ross Anderson (University of Cambridge)
– Eavesdropping of unencrypted internal transmission of authentication
data (RAND, SRES) from AuC to visited MSC
• Weakness
– GSM standard only describes interfaces between network components.
– They forgot the demand for internal encryption.
– Microwave links are widely used for internal linkage of network
components.
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– Identities of users of
a certain radio cell
– Eavesdropping of
communications
– (Telephone at the
expense of others)
• Man-in-the-middle
attack (Masquerade)
• Weakness
– No protection against
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network components
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Universal mobile telecommunication system (UMTS)
• Security functions of UMTS …
… have been »inspired« by GSM security functions
• From GSM
– Subscriber identity confidentiality (TMSI)
– Subscriber authentication
– Radio interface encryption
– SIM card (now called USIM)
– Authentication of subscriber towards SIM by means of a PIN
– Delegation of authentication to visited network
– No need to adopt standardized authentication algorithms
• Additional UMTS security features
– Enhanced UMTS authentication and key agreement mechanism
– Integrity protection of signaling information (prevents false-base-station attacks)
– New ciphering / key agreement / integrity protection algorithms
… and a few minor features
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Authentication function in the USIM
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Security mode setup procedure
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• Combination of Output Feedback mode (OFB) and counter mode
• First encryption under CK’ prevents chosen plaintext attacks (initialization
vector is encrypted, KM: key modifier)
Key stream is XORed with MESSAGE block
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Integrity algorithm f9
• ISO/IEC 9797-1 (MAC algorithm 2)
• Sender and receiver use f9
• Receiver verifies MAC == XMAC
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Protection of locations
• Mobile user
– whishes to be reachable at his current location.
– He won’t be localizable by outsiders and the network operator unless the
explicitly gives his permission
• There is no mobile network that fulfills this demand.
Protection of locations
• GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication)
– Distributed storage at location registers
• Home Location Register  (HLR)
• Visitor Location Register (VLR)
– Network operator has global view on location information
• Tracking of mobile users is possible
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Systematic: Protection of locations
A. Trust into the mobile station only
A.1 Broadcast method
A.2 Group pseudonyms
B. Additional trust into a private fixed station
B.1 Trusted address translation and broadcast
B.2 Reduction of broadcast areas
B.3 Explicit trustworthy storage of locations
B.4 Temporary pseudonyms (TP method)
C. Additional trust into a trusted third party
C.1 Trust Center
C.2 Co-operating chips
C.3 Mobile Communication-MIXing
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Overview: Broadcast
• No storage of locations and global paging of mobile users
Overview: Broadcast
• No storage of locations and global paging of mobile users
• Immense costs for bandwith …
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Overview : Trustworthy storage
• Replace databases by trusted devices in the fixed network
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• Replace databases by trusted devices in the fixed network
• Every location updating needs communication with trusted station.
• Question: How can we reduce cost of location updating?
Overview : Trustworthy storage
A
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• Tempory Pseudonyms (TP method)
• Can we do this without a trusted fixed station?
Overview : Trustworthy storage
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Overview : Mobile Communication-MIXing
• Covered storage of location information
• A MIX hides the communication relation between
– HLR and VLR
– VLR and location area
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Implicit Addresses
• First contact: Covered Implicit Address CIA
– Recipient publishes public encryption key c
– Sender creates CIA := c(R,S,M)
• Redundancy R
• Seed S of a pseudo-random generator PRG
• Message M (optional, may contain symmetric key k)
– Recipient decrypts all received messages with private key d
• Finds correct R for own messages only
• Following addressing: Open Implicit Address OIA
– OIAi+1 := PRG(i,seed)  (i = 0,1,2,…)
– Sender :
• calculates next OIA
• encrypts message (optional) M under k
• Sends OIA, M
– Receiver: Associative memory of all valid OIAs to recognize own
messages
Broadcast method
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• Performance
covered implicit address: B = 500 bit
open implicit address: B = 50 bit
minimal coding: B = Èld(n)˘
bandwidth b 
[bit/s]
number of users n
† 
Tv =
2 ⋅ m - n ⋅ l
2 ⋅ m ⋅ (m - n ⋅ l)
† 
m =
b
B
† 
l =1/(300 s)
Tv = 0.5 s
Performance: Message lengths on the air interface
• Mobile Terminated Calls
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Performance: Message lengths on the air interface
• Location Update
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Security of mobile communication
• Conclusion
– Protection of locations can be technically realized
– However, there is a demand for legal enforcement
• More information
– http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/mobil/
